ABBREVIATIONS AND TYPOGRAPHICAL CONVENTIONS

THE following conventions are adopted throughout:
Concepts are construed as mental particulars. Names of concepts are
written in capitals. Thus, ‘RED’ names the concept that expresses redness
or the property of being red. Formulas in capitals are not, in general,
structural descriptions of the concepts they denote. See Chapter 3, n. 1.
Names of English expressions appear in single quotes. Thus ‘‘red’’ is
the name of the homophonic English word.
Names of semantic values of words and concepts are written in italics.
Thus ‘RED expresses the property of being red’ and ‘ ‘Red’ expresses the
property of being red ’ are both true.
The following abbreviations are used frequently (especially in Chapters
6 and 7).
RTM: The representational theory of the mind
IRS: Informational role semantics
MOP: Mode of presentation
MR: Mental representation
IA: Informational atomism
SA: The standard argument (for radical concept innateness)
SIA: Supplemented informational atomism (= IA plus a locking theory
of concept possession)
d/D problem: The doorknob/DOORKNOB problem.
ABBREVIATIONS AND
TYPOGRAPHICAL CONVENTIONS
MY topic is what concepts are. Since I’m interested in that question
primarily as it arises in the context of ‘representational’ theories of mind
(RTMs), a natural way to get started would be for me to tell you about
RTMs and about how they raise the question what concepts are. I could
then set out my answer, and you could tell me, by return, what you think
is wrong with it. The ensuing discussion would be abstract and theory
laden, no doubt; but, with any luck, philosophically innocent.
That is, in fact, pretty much the course that I propose to follow. But, for
better or for worse, in the present climate of philosophical opinion it’s
perhaps not possible just to plunge in and do so. RTMs have all sorts of
problems, both of substance and of form. Many of you may suppose the
whole project of trying to construct one is hopelessly wrong-headed; if it
is, then who cares what RTMs say about concepts? So I guess I owe you
some sort of general argument that the project isn’t hopelessly wrongheaded.
But I seem to have grown old writing books defending RTMs; it occurs
to me that if I were to stop writing books defending RTMs, perhaps I
would stop growing old. So I think I’ll tell you a joke instead. It’s an old
joke, as befits my telling it.
Old joke: Once upon a time a disciple went to his guru and said: ‘Guru,
what is life?’ To which the Guru replies, after much thinking, ‘My Son,
life is like a fountain.’The disciple is outraged. ‘Is that the best that you can
do? Is that what you call wisdom?’ ‘All right,’ says the guru; ‘don’t get
excited. So maybe it’s not like a fountain.’
That’s the end of the joke, but it’s not the end of the story. The guru
noticed that taking this line was losing him clients, and gurus have to eat.